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Abstract
Physicians, nurses, and other clinicians readily acknowledge being troubled by encounters with patients who trig-
ger moral judgments. For decades social scientists have noted that moral judgment of patients is pervasive, occur-
ring not only in egregious and criminal cases but also in everyday situations in which appraisals of patients’ social
worth and culpability are routine. There is scant literature, however, on the actual prevalence and dynamics of
moral judgment in healthcare. The indirect evidence available suggests that moral appraisals function via a com-
plex calculus that reflects variation in patient characteristics, clinician characteristics, task, and organizational factors.
The full impact of moral judgment on healthcare relationships, patient outcomes, and clinicians’ own well-being is
yet unknown. The paucity of attention to moral judgment, despite its significance for patient-centered care, com-
munication, empathy, professionalism, healthcare education, stereotyping, and outcome disparities, represents a
blind spot that merits explanation and repair. New methodologies in social psychology and neuroscience have
yielded models for how moral judgment operates in healthcare and how research in this area should proceed.
Clinicians, educators, and researchers would do well to recognize both the legitimate and illegitimate moral apprai-
sals that are apt to occur in healthcare settings.
Introduction
In 1926 Francis Peabody ended his most celebrated lec-
ture with the oft-repeated conclusion, “the secret of car-
ing for the patient is caring for the patient” [1]. It’sa
compelling line, resonant with wisdom and common
sense, but it begs an obvious question. What if I don’t
care for the patient? In particular, what if my reaction
to the patient is negative, perhaps intensely so, driven
by social and/or moral disapproval? This last question
arises occasionally in bioethics and “difficult patient”
discussions, but beyond assertions as to what should
happen, there is little systematic data on what actually
happens.
Most healthcare professionals have found themselves
treating someone who is flagrantly offensive, whose atti-
tudes and actions have caused others to suffer harm.
Physicians and nurses readily admit that empathy is
more difficult to achieve in these situations and that
their professional ideals feel strained. Two published
reports will illustrate:
Renate Justin’s new patient with emphysema revealed
during her intake history that she was an unrepentant
Nazi anti-Semite who had supervised slave laborers dur-
ing the war. Justin, a Jewish family physician, struggled
through the turmoil of her feelings and duties before
the second visit.
“I had decided that if she stayed with my practice, I
could probably be a skilled and trustworthy physi-
cian to her. Intellectually, I had concluded that my
job as a doctor was to take care of her, regardless of
her history. I felt that I could achieve this: I could
treat her emphysema and suppress or control my
moral outrage. What I did not know was whether I
could be compassionate.” [2]
In a 2004 account of a Midwestern surgical intensive
care unit, anthropologistJ o a nC a s s e l lf o u n dt h a t
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about their patients’ personal stories. Not so the nurses.
“T h en u r s e sa l w a y sk n o wt h ep a t i e n t s ’ stories: the
accidents, tragedies, and sorrows that brought them
to the hospital, their family constellations, and their
clashes with others and, on occasion, with the crim-
inal justice system. As a result, however, some
nurses make harsh moral judgments.”
They nurses freely disparaged criminals, as well as the
woman who was thought to be loaded on heroin and
alcohol when she failed to fasten a seatbelt on her
three-year-old son, with devastating results [3].
In the first example, Dr. Justin girded herself so as to
prevent negative consequences to her patient, a cogni-
tive and emotional maneuver that comes with a cost to
clinician wellbeing. In the surgical ICU, as Cassell docu-
ments, it was the patients who reaped the most obvious
negative consequences of clinicians’ judgments.
The prominence of moral judgment in such egregious
situations is self-evident, but this review will stake out
the broader claim that moral emotions and judgments
are active in everyday clinical encounters. The role of
moral judgment is largely unrecognized in the literatures
on healthcare communication, caring, empathy, trust,
disparities, and education. Yet since the mid-twentieth
century, sociologists have noted the prevalence of moral
judgment in healthcare. And increasingly over the last
decade, social psychologists and neuroscientists have
produced a rich body of work on moral emotions and
cognitions that promises to reframe our understandings
of morally charged clinical relationships. This review
will survey these literatures and the scant empirical data
from physician and nurse researchers that are relevant
to moral judgment, highlighting the variation that
emerges from diverse combinations of patients, clini-
cians, tasks, and settings, as well as the most promising
research strategies.
Methods
The search for studies on moral judgment in healthcare
was largely disappointing, even within the literatures on
empathy and caring. The literature on difficult clinical
relationships is extensive, but moral judgment is at best
a secondary focus in these studies. Research on attitudes
to stigmatized conditions such as obesity, substance
abuse, and self-harm is limited but relevant. Using a
variety of PubMed search strategies, e.g., with MESH
terms “morals,”“ empathy,”“ physician-patient relations,”
and “nurse-patient relations,” I retrieved 23,240 English-
language references. Of these, I identified 400 potentially
useful articles. Manual searches of these led to addi-
tional articles and searches in snowball fashion. Of the
2000 articles I eventually examined, less than a hundred
offered any pertinent data from healthcare settings.
G i v e nt h ep a u c i t yo fr e s e a r c ho nm o r a ld y n a m i c si n
healthcare relationships, this review is an exploratory
exercise in “sensemaking,” which Karl Weick likens to
cartography [4]. I worked with my final collection of
articles like a dataset, sorting and coding the observa-
tions and results in constant comparative fashion, test-
ing my categories against the data, my experience, and
my own interviews, seeking to identify at least the major
landmarks in this neglected terrain. Tables 1 and 2 illus-
trate the breadth and creativity of methodologies
employed in the reviewed studies from healthcare and
social psychology, respectively.
The organizational and reciprocal dynamics of difficult
relationships
The difficult patient is one who “makes me feel ineffec-
tive,” according to a 1958 study that canvassed a clinic’s
physicians, nurses, social workers, and clerical workers
[5]. Patients who fail to validate clinicians’ sense of
themselves as effective professionals, who threaten their
control, and/or who create fruitless work are all subject
to being labeled “bad patients.” Kelly and May noted
these themes of validation, compliance, and efficiency in
a 1982 review, as well as the methodological weaknesses
and “high moral tone” that still pervade this literature
[6]. A review by John Eisenberg sounded similar themes,
noting that “much of the literature in this field consists
of normative descriptions of how a physician should
behave. Further investigation is needed into how the
clinician does behave” [7].
The best naturalistic studies of how clinicians actually
behave come from sociologists. In a 1963 report, Irving
Zola found that the treatment of medically unexplained
symptoms in three clinics at Massachusetts General
Hospital varied by patient ethnicity, physician specialty,
the spatial layout of the clinic, and the path sequence of
patient contact with physicians and ancillary personnel
[8]. The physicians might have described these patients
as “difficult,” but Zola focused on the organizational fac-
tors of care that significantly influenced complex reci-
procal interactions between patients and physicians, as
well as the ethnic differences (Italian and Irish) in how
these lower-class patients presented their symptoms.
The classic sociological studies showed no reticence in
reflecting ascribed social and/or moral worth of patients.
According to Glaser and Strauss, “In our society we
value people, more or less, on the basis of various social
characteristics: for example,a g e ,s k i nc o l o r ,e t h n i c i t y ,
education, occupation, family status, social class, beauty,
‘personality,’ talent, and accomplishments” [9]. Their
study found that nurses judged dying patients by their
perceived social loss, often giving “more than routine
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care” to the unworthy. “People dying from a Friday
night knife fight, or the adolescent on the verge of death
who has killed others in a wild car drive, have their own
social loss reinforced by an ‘it’st h e i ro w nf a u l t ’
rationale.”
Julius Roth’s extended study of six emergency depart-
ments, published in 1972, found that hospital staff
“make judgments about the worthiness of the person
and the appropriateness of his demands and take these
judgments into account when performing the service”
[10]. Several of Roth’s findings are pertinent. First, he
emphasized that staff will take moral judgments into
account “unless discouraged from doing so by the organi-
zational arrangements under which they work“ (italics in
original). Also, “We observed hints that certain ethnic
groups are discriminated against, but this is very difficult
to detect nowadays because everyone is extremely sensi-
tive to the possibility of accusations of racial discrimina-
tion.” These observations suggest that organizational
norms do have impacts on staff’s moral judgments and/
or behavior. Consistent with the clinician effectiveness
theme cited above, in straightforward surgical cases “the
characteristics and behavior of the patient can be largely
ignored.”
Roth detailed how patients acquire labels, sometimes
even before arriving at the hospital, e.g., when police or
paramedics describe someone, more or less accurately,
as a “drunk.” Labeling is not always straightforward or
consistent, however, as more recent research demon-
strates. An ethnographic study on a nursing unit found
that patients could acquire a likable label even when
they were non-compliant or demanding or had a stig-
matizing illness [11]. Furthermore, their labels could
vary from nurse to nurse and over time, and nurses
could hold multiple appraisals of the same patient.
Demographic data are not necessarily a patient’s destiny.
In a rich ethnographic meta-analysis from three nursing
units, Colleen Varcoe and colleagues elaborated on the
contextual dynamics of labeling [12]. Stereotypical
Table 1 Methodologies of the healthcare studies discussed
Ethnography, participant observation, qualitative interviews, focus groups Cassell, 2004 [3]; Zola, 1963 [8]; Glaser, 1964 [9]; Roth, 1972 [10]; Varcoe,
2003 [12]; Emerson, 1976 [16]; Jeffery, 1979 [18]; Bolton, 2005 [19];
Willems, 2005 [40]; Monnickendam, 2007 [45]; Fiscella, 1997 [46]; May,
2004 [48]; Wear, 2006 [50]; Hadfield, 2009 [54]; Lyth, 1988 [60]
Survey of clinicians or patients (not both) Weitzman, 2000 [44]; Malat, 2006 [47]; Mackay, 2005 [53]; Nicolaidis, 2005
[56]; Regan, 2009 [61]; Foster, 2003 [64]; von Hippel, 2008 [66]; Merrill,
1993 [87]
Mixed survey and qualitative interviews Bowers, 2002 [20]; Regehr, 2002 [129]
Linked qualitative physician and patient interviews Scott, 2008 [26]
Linked patient and physician surveys with one-year follow-up patient
survey
Hall, 2002 [13]
Videotaped visits followed by linked qualitative interviews of patients and
clinicians
Katz, 2009 [14]
Observed and audiotaped visits followed by linked qualitative interviews
of patients and clinicians
Weissmann, 2006 [110]
Qualitative physician interviews linked to patient record review Shaw, 2004 [17]
Survey of physicians linked to patient records and angiogram data van Ryn, 2006 [71]
Standardized patient visits (surreptitiously audiotaped) linked to
psychological testing of physicians
Chapman, 2008 [88]
Psychological tests and speech analysis of patients linked to
psychological tests and speech analysis of clinicians
Berry, 2008 [93]
Tests of implicit and explicit attitudes linking clinicians and patients (IAT) Brener, 2007 [65]
Conversation analysis of videotaped visits Webb, 2009 [51]; Pillet-Shore, 2006 [52]
Web-based trigger written vignette and photo followed by survey and
implicit attitude tests (IAT)
Green, 2007 [70]
Trigger videotape followed by countertransference instrument Schwartz, 2007 [59]
Educator interviews of trainees following observed visits Smith, 2005 [62]
Trigger written vignette followed by survey and empathy instrument Tait, 2005 [49]
Controlled experiment randomizing medical students into different
teaching programs with quantitative and qualitative performance,
psychological, and sociological data
Hammond, 1959 [42]
The first cluster encompasses a diverse group of qualitative methodologies, often mixed within the same study. The survey methodologies in the second cluster
also vary significantly. Of note are studies that link specific clinicians to data on their specific patients. IAT = Implicit Association Test.
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increased in the context of time pressures and limited
resources, whether actual or perceived. Their analysis
showed, however, that this justificatory “ideology of
scarcity” derives not only from higher management and
policy arenas, but also from the local organizational
microculture, sustained by the nurses’ own matrix of
personal relationships.
Judith Hall and colleagues revealed the reciprocity of
“liking” by surveying both patients (diabetics at Kaiser)
and physicians immediately after a visit [13]. The
patients and physicians were able to gauge whether the
other liked them, and that perception predicted whether
they themselves liked the other. Physicians liked their
healthier patients more than their sick patients, and
healthier patients liked their physicians more. Physician
liking predicted patient satisfaction a year later. Katz
and Alegria examined the reciprocity of appraisals in
greater detail by analyzing videotapes of visits together
with linked qualitative interviews of patients and clini-
cians in a mental health clinic, revealing the social and
moral judgments involved [14]. This triangulation of
data allowed the researchers to document precise
moments in which clinicians dropped their stereotypes
and became fully present with their patients. Their
patients clearly recognized and responded to those
moments of engagement.
Dirty work expertise
The “dirty work” literature [15] further explores the
contextual dynamics of moral judgment. Dirty work
tends to be designated as such because it is inherently
“odious and onerous” and often ineffective, as described
in a study of community psychiatric emergency inter-
vention [16]. This literature confirms and extends the
earlier finding that patients who fail to legitimize clini-
cians’ effectiveness acquire negative labels. Patients with
mental illness, for instance, frequently represent dirty
work to primary care physicians, whereas moral or
social judgments may not matter when the same
patients present with remediable problems [17]. As one
physician gleefully noted, “I enjoy anything which
involves bone-setting, plastering, stitching, draining
pus” [18].
Clinicians doing dirty work may be able to transform
their chosen fields, however tainted and stigmatized,
into grounds for pride in their expertise and commit-
ment. Sharon Bolton has described the extraordinary
moral complexity of nurses on a gynecology unit
devoted to failed pregnancies, abortions, cancer,
Table 2 Methodologies of illustrative social psychology and neuroscience studies discussed
Web-based survey (psychological instruments including vignette trigger) of students and managers Reynolds, 2007 [28]
Functional MRI responses and lexical priming tests of stereotype activation to trigger photographs (black and white faces)
under three different social task conditions
Wheeler, 2005 [30]
Functional MRI and emotional responses to trigger photographs illustrating different social groups and objects Harris, 2006 [31]
Web-based international survey using measures of beliefs, attitudes, and stereotypes Oldmeadow, 2007
[32]
Moral judgment responses to vignettes under four different conditions stimulating disgust and neutral controls Schnall, 2008a [33]
Functional MRI responses to moral and non-moral stimuli of disgust Borg, 2008 [34]
Moral judgment responses to heterosexual and homosexual couples and completion of disgust sensitivity scale; IAT response
to heterosexual and homosexual couples
Inbar, 2009a [35]
Web-based surveys of disgust sensitivity, political orientation and political attitudes Inbar, 2009b [36]
Moral judgment responses to vignettes following verbal priming for cleanliness or control and following hand-washing or
control
Schnall, 2008b [37]
Measures of automatic evaluations of a person given various positive and negative information, photos with changing
backgrounds, and affective priming
Rydell, 2009 [73]
Measure of egalitarian commitment and priming test of preconscious stereotype activation Moskowitz, 1999
[75]
Functional MRI responses to written scripts stimulating specific moral emotions Moll, 2007 [79]
Measures of subjective autonomic awareness, skin conductance, heart rate, and behavior of subjects in an immersive virtual
environment who were told to give electric shocks to a virtual (not real) stranger
Slater, 2006 [84]
Functional MRI responses while playing video games King, 2006 [85]
Measures of emotional response, generosity, and oxytocin (and 4 other hormones) in response to emotional videos Barraza, 2009 [98]
Functional MRI responses to unpleasant pictures, including moral violations Harenski, 2008
[106]
Measures of expressive behavior, subjective feelings, and physiology (pulse, finger temperature, skin conductance, heart rate
and somatic activity) in response to disgusting film stimuli under different instructions to control versus suppress feelings
Gross, 1998 [121]
This table highlights the diversity of research methodologies. MRI = magnetic resonance imaging, IAT = Implicit Association Test.
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Experienced nurses in such settings may hold and
express strongly ambivalent feelings and judgments
toward patients as well as toward inexperienced nurses
and the physician staff. In this study, the nurses
described a process of developing both task and emo-
tional expertise over time, e.g., in getting past their
sometimes intense physical repugnance by focusing on
details of the process at hand. The uniqueness of their
challenges and expertise fostered group cohesion, which
helped to sustain them individually and to diminish the
salience of moral issues.
Len Bowers has studied individual and organizational
factors associated with positive attitudes toward work in
three institutions for criminals with dangerous and
severe personality disorders [20-22]. In order to manage
their anger, frustration, disgust, and repulsion, nurses
used a variety of strategies, including high moral and
professional commitments, deep psychosocial under-
standings of the patients, and appropriately limited
expectations. They also relied on interpersonal, team,
and organizational supports, leading Bowers to recom-
mend sustained managerial commitment to supportive
treatment philosophies, operational practices, training,
and supervision.
The limits and value of professionalism
Apart from recommendations as to how clinicians
should behave, the literatures on bioethics and profes-
sionalism are largely silent as to the frequency, impact,
and dynamics of moral appraisals. Mary Catherine
Beach and colleagues have argued that physicians’ moral
obligation includes “recognition of the unconditional
value of patients as persons” (italics in original) [23].
While conceding that feeling respect for all patients may
require “internal work,” they did not describe that inter-
nal work or address how it could be accomplished.
Jones and McCullough, considering the case of a death
row inmate with HIV and indications for abdominal
aneurysm repair, simply asserted that the surgeon
should proceed with the repair because “ethical obliga-
tions to all patients needing your care do not vary with
their character, social histories, belief systems, or other
features unrelated to their medical condition” [24].
Such exhortations gloss over the internal and interper-
sonal challenges described, for instance, in Groves’ land-
mark article about “hateful patients” [25]. There can be
little doubt, however, that many clinicians struggle earn-
estly to control their emotions and judgments in order
to meet these professional standards. A study of exem-
plar primary care physician healers found that their first
commitment was “a conscious attempt... to be nonjudg-
mental” [26]. Indeed, one of these physicians reported,
“I try to love every single patient. And I especially try to
love those I initially hate.” This commitment can some-
times lead to heroic professionalism, as in the case of a
surgeon who dutifully treated terrorists after they had
killed members of his family [27].
Although there is no social psychology literature
addressing how clinicians manage their moral judg-
ments, considerable work suggests the dynamics
involved. Normative behavior can be motivated by a
combination of high social consensus, e.g.,a se v i d e n c e d
in organizational and professional norms to be nonjudg-
mental, together with a person’s acquired self-image as
a moral individual [28]. Conversely, lack of social con-
sensus or lack of strong moral identity weakens a per-
son’s motivation. Straightforward exhortations in
support of professional standards have their place.
Friend and competent, foe and incompetent, or
ambivalent?
The social psychology research most obviously relevant
to adverse moral judgment in healthcare is that of
Susan Fiske and colleagues. Fiske has hypothesized that
people stereotype groups on two different dimensions,
the first being friend/foe (warmth) and the second being
capability (competence) [29]. While people stereotype
their own group as both warm and competent, they
judge most outgroups ambivalently by ascribing both
negative and positive characteristics to them. For exam-
ple, Americans tend to think of rich people and femin-
ists as cold and competent, elderly people and
housewives as warm and incompetent. Very few groups,
e.g., homeless people and drug addicts, are stereotyped
as both cold and incompetent, thus triggering contempt
and disgust.
Functional neuroimaging (functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging, or fMRI) substantiates these patterns.
Under time pressure and cognitive load, white Ameri-
cans seeing black faces activated their stereotypes, as
measured by a priming response time test, and their
amygdala, as measured on fMRI [30]. This automatic
pattern evaporated, however, with a simple prompt to
individuate the photos either by asking subjects to find
a dot on the face or to guess whether the person liked a
particular vegetable. Automatic, stereotypical responses
appear to be mediated by negative emotions such as
f e a r ,a n g e r ,d i s g u s t ,a n dc o ntempt. Photos of homeless
people and drug addicts, mixed in with other photos of
people and objects, triggered disgust and activated the
amygdala and insula, thought to be associated with fear
and disgust, respectively [31]. Also, photos of homeless
people, drug addicts, and inanimate objects failed to
activate the medial prefrontal cortex, unlike all the other
photos of people, thus offering a neuroscience model of
dehumanization. This line of work presents powerful
evidence for the impact of primitive emotional
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describe the mechanisms by which such responses are
activated or not. Oldmeadow and Fiske have further
found that a person’s ideological beliefs moderate their
stereotypes. Individuals who are motivated and informed
are more likely to make nuanced judgments [32].
There is now a large social psychology and neu-
roscience literature describing the particular role of dis-
gust in moral judgment [33,34]. Individuals differ in
disgust sensitivity, which predicts disapproval of gay
men, for instance [35]. Indeed, conservatives have higher
disgust sensitivity than liberals [36]. Unsurprisingly, the
cleanliness of the immediate environment influences the
experience of disgust and the severity of moral judg-
ments [37], a finding with obvious relevance to less-
than-pristine safety-net healthcare settings. Use of ritual
can also moderate disgust. One ethnographer found that
operating room rituals do far more than merely ensure
sterility. She observed surgeons to be dispassionate dur-
ing surgery that exposed internal organs, secretions, pus,
and feces, yet the same surgeons expressed discomfort
and disgust when sitting in a darkened room watching
movies of similar procedures, deprived of their protec-
tive organizing rituals [38].
Poor people risk moral judgment
Poor patients belong to outgroups of particular interest in
healthcare. Public hospitals serving these groups comprise
only 2% of acute care hospitals in the United States but
train 21% of doctors and 36% of allied health professionals
[39]. Primary care physicians serving poor communities
are often troubled by what they perceive as their patients’
inadequate motivation and dysfunctional behavioral char-
acteristics [40]. For two centuries American hospitals pla-
cated funders, physicians, and paying patients by carefully
distinguishing between the deserving and undeserving
poor [41]. The social medicine educators who implemen-
ted the first “patient-centered” comprehensive medical
education program in 1953 stumbled against the sociologi-
cal reality–not merely the self-serving stereotype–of this
divide [42]. Students in this University of Colorado pro-
gram were happy to care for the family-oriented working
poor, who were disproportionately Black or Latino, but
they often became frustrated and angry with “the chroni-
cally unemployed, the second–and in rare instances the
third–generation of welfare recipients, the socially inade-
quate, the fatherless families, the heavy drinkers from Lari-
mer Street, the chronic social agency clients, the unstable
personalities.” One student observed in exasperation, “Mr.
K’s recreation consists of watching the family television set
with an occasional interlude of general mistreatment of
wife and family.”
A recent review highlighted the paucity of more cur-
rent data available on medical student attitudes toward
the poor [43]. As discussed below, attitudes are multi-
factorial complexes. In a study of 12 urban hospitals,
the factors predicting whether pediatric residents felt
more anger and less empathy toward underserved
families were whether their clinics were well-run and
whether they themselves felt effective [44]. Black resi-
dents felt more positively about both their clinics and
their effectiveness. An Israeli study has looked closely
at the role of physicians’ international ethnicities, atti-
tudes, and behaviors in caring for poor patients [45],
but the moral complexities of interactions between
international medical graduates and the diverse poor
populations in the United States have received scant
attention [46]. Unsurprisingly, patients at risk of moral
judgment, including those who are poor, underedu-
cated, and/or African-American, pay significantly more
attention to impression management than do other
patients [47].
Medical conditions or moral issues?
As suggested by the difficult patient literature, condi-
tions that do not readily fit the clinician’s model of care
and practice can place patients in moral jeopardy. Carl
May and colleagues found that physicians quickly make
evaluative judgments of patients’ motives, the legitimacy
of their symptoms, and the congruence between the
physician’s and the patient’s conceptual model of illness
[48]. Patients with chronic low back pain or medically
unexplained illness, unlike those with menorrhagia, trig-
gered negotiations that often led to unresolved contests
of wills between physician and patient. Patients with
problems and anxieties that could not be referred out or
satisfactorily contained could trigger physician frustra-
tion and hostility. Similarly, a vignette study showed
that surgeons were quick to see patients as psychologi-
cally culpable for failed back surgery, a tendency moder-
ated by their varying levels of empathy [49].
In a study of the derogatory humor used by medical
students, Delese Wear and colleagues found that obese
patients were the most common targets, particularly in
surgical settings [50]. In part this derision had a practi-
cal base: “Obesity makes an easy 20 minute surgery a
difficult 80 minute surgery.” B u ti ta l s od e r i v e df r o m
students’ appraisals of obese patients as blameworthy.
Using the exquisite, fine-grain methodology of conversa-
tion analysis, Helena Webb has revealed the pervasive
nature of moral judgment in an obesity clinic [51].
What was remarkable, moreover, was how the patients
themselves described their weight loss progress in moral
terms of good and bad and how actively they shaped the
conversation to reflect their agency or their lack of
blame. Even during the brief and seemingly simple act
of weighing for primary care visits, as studied in another
conversation analysis, the videotaped nurse-patient
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themselves morally accountable [52].
Blameworthy appraisals are more likely for conditions
that appear controllable and that appear to be social as
much as medical in origin. Self-injurious behavior, e.g.,
suicide attempts and cutting, tends to generate anger
and frustration along with diminished optimism and
effort [53], unless, notably, the clinician self-identifies as
having expertise in assisting these patients [54]. Suicidal
patients can also trigger frank malice and aversion, with
sometimes lethal results. Inexperienced clinicians with
aspirations to “heal all, know all and love all” are parti-
cularly susceptible to these antitherapeutic impulses
[55]. As for patients who choose to remain in abusive
relationships, a majority of clinicians may be empathetic
if the patient is poor or disabled, but fewer are empa-
thetic if the patient is an educated professional [56].
Such discrepant responses are consistent with the Fiske
ambivalent stereotypes model described above, which
predicts either warmth or perceived competence, but
not both.
Evidence for attitudes as complex systems
The Institute of Medicine committees on medical edu-
cation and on healthcare disparities both highlighted the
impact of physicians’ attitudes on their patient relation-
ships [57,58]. Evidence from diverse disciplines, how-
ever, makes it clear that a person’s attitudes are neither
unitary nor stable. While these studies do not tease out
moral judgment from other cognitive and emotional
processes, they illustrate the spectrum of methodologies
that may prove useful.
Articles on countertransference in clinical medicine
are often insightful but famously lack systematic empiri-
cal data. In one exception, Schwartz and colleagues
showed trigger tapes of antisocial personality disorder
and schizophrenia followed by use of a validated instru-
ment that captures emotional and covert interpersonal
responses [59]. Unsurprisingly, in this sample of 73
graduate level mental health professionals, the schizo-
phrenic patient triggered warmth reactions and the anti-
social patient triggered challenge and dread. In her
qualitative study of a British hospital, Isabel Menzies
Lyth observed, “The work situation arouses very strong
and mixed feelings in the nurse: pity, compassion and
love; guilt and anxiety; hatred and resentment of the
patients who arouse these strong feelings; envy of the
care given to the patient” [60]. Regan and colleagues
studied unconscious defense mechanisms in nurses and
found that immature defenses, including passive aggres-
sion, correlated with emotional exhaustion (burnout),
but they themselves had significant concerns about the
instrument they used [61]. Smith and colleagues have
developed a method of teaching personal awareness,
specifically of previously unrecognized feelings and
behaviors, by having expert medical educators question
and probe trainees following observed clinical interac-
tions. Smith has been able to surface multiple fears,
anxieties, and unhelpful behaviors, including unrecog-
nized anger, disdain, and withdrawal [62].
The Implicit Attitude Test (IAT), which has made its
way from social psychology into healthcare settings,
depends upon subjects’ response time to distinguish
positive from negative unconscious attitudes. Negative
explicit attitudes regarding addiction, including moral
blame, are well-documented among nurses and other
healthcare professionals [63,64]. In studies of physicians
and nurses treating hepatitis C in injection drug users,
Brener and colleagues used a version of the IAT and
found that greater contact with hepatitis C patients was
associated with more positive explicit attitudes but less
positive implicit (unconscious) attitudes [65]. Further-
more, implicit attitudes predicted intention to change
jobs (burnout) independently from the effects of explicit
attitudes and job satisfaction [66].
Multiple concerns have surfaced about the IAT and
related priming techniques, however, suggesting that the
relationship between explicit and implicit attitudes is
not yet clear [67-69]. A vignette study using the IAT
found that physicians had no explicit bias against black
patients but did have implicit biases that predicted their
decisions to use thrombolytic treatment in the scenario
[70]. A study of actual cardiac patients found that surgi-
cal recommendations varied by race for Black men, but
not Black women or Hispanics, and that the effects of
race were mediated by physician perceptions of patients’
education and activity levels [71]. The social and psy-
chological dynamics producing racial disparities are as
yet poorly understood [72].
Neuroscience studies have shown that automatic,
unconscious attitudes are highly sensitive to new infor-
mation and new contexts [73]. While the amygdala pro-
duces a rapid, stereotypical initial response to a
stimulus, other brain regions including the prefrontal
cortex can follow with iterative reprocessing at a rate of
eight cycles per second, leading to more complex and
nuanced responses [74]. People who are chronically
committed to egalitarian goals can inhibit stereotype
activation preconsciously, that is, without awareness or
new effort [75]. Social and moral intuitions shaped by
extensive experience and learning can operate without
any conscious awareness [76].
Researchers no longer think of moral judgments as
exclusively cognitive [77]. Even those who minimize the
emotional component acknowledge that emotions play a
powerful role in motivating relevant action [78]. Using
functional MRI, we can now visualize the neural sub-
stantiation of moral emotions. Guilt and compassion
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gust and indignation [79].
The simple stimuli and vignette studies that are stock-
in-trade for social psychologists and neuroscientists are
appropriate for research on first impressions in health-
care, where encounters with strangers increasingly char-
acterize the patient experience [80]. But negative
appraisals may develop dynamically over the course of
an encounter and may arise, change, or disappear as
encounters become relationships, much as Goffman
described for the discovery and management of stigma
[81]. Fortunately, social psychologists themselves recog-
nize the need for more naturalistic research strategies
[82,83]. Subjects in an immersion virtual environment
may respond as if the situation is real, as shown by a
virtual replication of the Milgram obedience experiment
[84]. Neuroscientists have begun to use videogames as
stimuli for subjects in functional MRI scanners [85].
Within healthcare, Debra Roter and colleagues have
called for more creative simulations to investigate emo-
tion and non-verbal behavior, not only by using standar-
dized patients but also by having patients or clinicians
respond to vignettes and videotaped interactions [86].
Variation among clinicians
Studies of clinician personalities, habits, and skills have
offered only modest insights into variations in moral
judgment. One study of medical student Machiavellian-
ism–itself predicted by male gender, authoritarianism,
intolerance of ambiguity, and external locus of control–
found that Machiavellian students had more negative
attitudes toward geriatric and hypochondriac patients
[87]. Benjamin Chapman and colleagues studied com-
munity primary care physicians in Rochester, Minnesota,
using personality tests and audiotaped standardized
patient visits, and found that personality characteristics
shaped their interviews of depressed patients [88]. Per-
sonality explained only 4-7% of the variance, however,
while physician demographic factors explained only
another 4-7%. The authors note that “patients who are
belligerent, distressed, passively noncompliant, medically
complex, or particularly knowledgeable, congenial, and
appreciative” might thereby influence communication,
but their study did not examine that influence.
Emotional intelligence measures appear to be emer-
ging from an infancy troubled by methodological con-
cerns and popular hype [89], but their application in
healthcare [90-92] has yet to focus on difficult patient
relationships. One pilot study of psychiatric patients and
staff suggested that attachment theory may predict the
success of therapeutic relationships: lower attachment
anxiety and avoidance scores of staff members corre-
lated with better relationships as rated by patients [93].
Medical students with secure attachment styles are
more likely to seek relationship-focused primary care
residencies [94].
Gender is often a factor in clinical relationships, as
illustrated by Hall’s reciprocal likability study cited
above in which female physicians said they liked their
patients more than male physicians did. Patients agreed
that female physicians liked them better and also said
that they liked female physicians more than they liked
m a l ep h y s i c i a n s[ 1 3 ] .W ed on o tk n o w ,h o w e v e r ,h o w
gender may figure in clinicians’ moral judgments of
patients. Sonia Crandall found that female medical stu-
dents had more favorable attitudes toward poor patients
than male medical students [95], although later studies
have not replicated this finding [44,96]. Women, includ-
ing female physicians, generally score higher than men
in empathy, but we still lack evidence that such differ-
ences are of consequence in clinical interactions [97]. In
a laboratory study using emotional videos as triggers,
women had greater responses than men in empathy,
monetary generosity, and oxytocin levels [98]. In addi-
tion to its roles in birth, lactation, and mother-infant
bonding, oxytocin has complex effects upon the brain
and social behavior in females and males [99], but its
roles in moral emotions are far from clear [100,101]. A
single intranasal dose of oxytocin in male students
increased their trust and social risk-taking in interactive
dyads [102]. Carole Gilligan’sh y p o t h e s i st h a tw o m e n
and men employ different modes of moral reasoning
(care versus justice) has failed to garner strong support
[103]. Indeed, Kohlberg’s theory of developmental moral
stages, on which Gilligan’s work depended, has itself
been significantly modified [104] or abandoned [77].
Nevertheless, studies continue to appear with evidence
of gender differences in emotionally-charged moral
appraisals [105]. Using functional neuroimaging, Carla
H a r e n s k if o u n dt h a te v e nw h e nw o m e na n dm e nm a k e
similar moral judgments, they may do so via different
dynamics, activating different brain circuitry [106].
Diverse studies cited here demonstrate the folly of
expecting unifactorial attributes of either patient or clin-
ician to dominate moral judgments. Once the clinician
is engaged in dyad and context, a complex system is in
play. In the course of this review I asked colleagues how
they managed their own moral judgments of patients.
Two simple examples illustrate these dynamic, often
conflicted appraisals. An experienced midwife working
in public sector explained that she felt little moral judg-
ment while caring for wayward pregnant women and
girls. “I’mo k a yw i t hm yp a t i e n t s , ” she said, “but I have
trouble with some of their partners when they appear.”
A family practitioner also reported that she had no diffi-
culty with the women who return multiple times with
the consequences of high-risk behavior. But upon learn-
i n gt h a tap a t i e n th a dap r i s o nb a c k g r o u n d ,“Ih a dt o
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had to ask.” One might ask why truth-telling itself rises
so infrequently as a moral issue in the minds of clini-
cians. In response to continual invasive questioning,
patients routinely withhold, distort, and otherwise injure
the truth, either consciously or not, and yet within the
clinical relationship and its contextual frame, such viola-
tions usually do not merit moral notice and do not trig-
ger moral appraisals.
The power of setting and organizational factors
Organizational factors may weigh more than individual
skills and attitudes in the salience of moral judgments,
as suggested in Bowers’ study of facilities for criminal
patients with personality disorders [20]. In the Univer-
sity of Colorado teaching program described above, frus-
tration with the poor and behaviorally difficult patients
occasionally escalated into hostility from students and
teaching staff [42]. The researchers noted that such hos-
tility was “almost always temporary,” however. “The
over-all attitude of the clinic staff toward patients cre-
ated an atmosphere in which hostile behavior was
immediately conspicuous.”
The importance of setting was obvious in my informal
survey of colleagues. Those in correctional healthcare
had learned how to compartmentalize and/or minimize
their appraisals. After all, a cooperative and appreciative
patient with Nazi tattoos is still a cooperative, apprecia-
tive patient. For those in middle-class or well-to-do clin-
ical settings, on the other hand, the issue of morally
reprehensible patients rarely arises. I did not find evi-
dence in the literature to support Jodi Halpern’s asser-
tion that, once physicians have invested in caring for
patients, they then “invest a great deal in idealizing”
them so as to avoid their own negative emotional reac-
tions [107]. Halpern may be right nevertheless. Clini-
cians with middle-class practices generally do not
ponder what percentage of those men and women have
molested children, whereas moral issues are quite salient
where convicted criminals come labeled as such. Idealiz-
ing distorts clinicians’ perceptions and thus limits biop-
sychosocial comprehension, but it may help motivate
clinicians to provide good care. In some cases, it may
also protect patients from clinicians who would be
unprepared for their own reactions to a more complete
picture.
The landscape between prison and polite suburbia,
based on the literature reviewed above and confirmed
by my own interviews, is one of great variation. I cer-
tainly heard people assert that moral appraisals were
off-limits and best avoided. “You can’tg ot h e r e . ” Most
of my respondents acknowledged that when a strong
moral judgment arises, it comes with palpable emotional
impact, sometimes accompanied by a change in strategy.
“I go numb, I just shut down.”“ I put up walls.”“ I switch
gears.” They described shifting from emotional engage-
ment to duty, “falling back on professionalism as a
floor.” Frequently I heard some version of, “It depends.”
Moral judgments of varying intensity are activated or
not, and are problematic or not, depending upon a com-
plex interplay among clinicians, patients, tasks, and
organizational factors. We know little about when such
judgments occur, what impact they have, which cortico-
limbic “gears” get “switched,” how, and why.
Promising subjects, settings, and strategies
Progress in understanding professional development and
skills often emerges from close studies of experts [108].
Recent empirical studies have focused on clinicians cho-
sen for expertise in de-escalating aggressive psychiatric
patients [109], in role-modeling humanistic bedside
behavior [110], and in discussing advance directives
[111]. Expertise may be largely tacit [112] and embodied
in habits that operate automatically without conscious
intention [113]. Such expertise may be more or less reli-
able [114,115]. William Branch and colleagues, noting
that well-intentioned traditional ways of teaching respect
to students generally fail, have begun gathering empiri-
cal data on expert approaches to modeling and teaching
humanistic behavior [110,116,117]. They have not, how-
ever, addressed issues of moral judgment, nor have they
focused on challenging safety-net and other stigmatized
settings.
Even without knowing exactly what should happen,
understanding what actually happens in such settings
would be invaluable. Safety-net settings concentrate
extreme outgroups, e.g., homeless alcoholics and drug
addicts, as well as groups that trigger ambivalent stereo-
types, thus offering challenges that often disconcert or
ensnare clinicians [118]. Who decides to work in such
settings, who performs well there, and who survives
over the long haul? With experience and age, many peo-
ple improve their emotional regulation and more skill-
fully defuse negative situations [119]. Do clinicians
demonstrate these improvements over the course of
their careers?
Most of us can point to role models who move with
such capacious modesty, competence, and wisdom that
patients (and trainees) respond with their better human-
ity. These role models seem to take in, contain, and
transmute negativity and pain. It would be helpful to
know the resources they bring to bear and the strategies
they use.
Research on emotion regulation may help us under-
stand how clinicians manage moral judgment. We can
regulate our emotions by focusing attention to task, as
implied by the dirty work studies cited above, or by
reappraising the situation. Cognitive reappraisal appears
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quences than emotion suppression strategies [120]. A
simple suggestion to control one’s feelings can decrease
disgust reactions to a stimul u s .T h es a m es t i m u l u sw i l l
increase autonomic stress markers when the instruction
is to hide (suppress) one’s feelings [121]. Emotion regu-
lation can also occur via more global strategies [122].
Mindfulness training, which has well-established physio-
logical and psychological benefits [123], can lead to
improvements in physicians’ wellbeing and strengthen-
ing of their patient-centered attitudes [124]. Evidence
for the multilevel benefits of narrative expression, as
described for Balint groups [125] and narrative medicine
[126], is also beginning to emerge from controlled stu-
dies in patient populations. Several brief exercises in
expressive writing have increased CD4+ counts for HIV
patients [127] and have decreased infirmary visits for
incarcerated sex offenders [128]. Creation of narratives
facilitates integration of experience into cognitive frame-
works, thereby down-regulating disturbing emotions.
Paramedics learn to cope with gore and danger using
cognitive strategies and organizational and interpersonal
support, but they report long-lingering distress from
events that they could not “make sense of” and integrate
into coherent stories [129].
Is interest as an essential quality?
One of the factors that may prevent clinicians from trig-
gering moral appraisals is interest, often equated with
curiosity. Recall that a subject in the Fiske experiment
could avoid lighting up her amygdala by focusing on
whether the person in the photo liked a certain vegeta-
ble or by looking for a dot on his face [30]. Good tea-
chers have stressed the value of curiosity for clinical
care [130,131]; one of my teachers insisted that “every
cirrhotic is different.” Writers that quote from Peabody’s
lecture, as I did in the opening paragraph, often neglect
the independent clause of his final sentence: “One of the
essential qualities of the clinician is interest in humanity,
for the secret of the care of the patient is in caring for
the patient.” With current social psychology methodolo-
gies, Peabody’s assertion about the critical role of inter-
est is now testable.
Several sociologists have long included interest, sur-
prise, and boredom in their work on emotions [132].
Social psychologist Paul Silvia has recently posited that
interest depends upon a combination of the stimulus
complexity and a person’s appraisal of her ability to
comprehend and cope with the stimulus [133]. Once a
stimulus–or perhaps patient, for our purposes–appears
beyond one’s comprehension and ability to manage,
interest wanes. These appraisals mediate individual per-
sonality differences in curiosity and the experience of
interest [134,135]. Carol Sansone points out that we can
use interest to self-regulate our motivation. When
intrinsic motivation lags, we can activate strategies to
engage our interest and thereby remain motivated for
the task [136]. When all else fails, we can try to take
interest in our own boredom, a classic maneuver in
reflective practice. One of the respondents in my infor-
mal survey, a psychologist with a police background,
described his strategy in leading therapy groups for sex
offenders, some of whose victims he had met and inter-
viewed: “My goal is to love them [the inmates], and if I
can’t do that, I at least try to love the process.”
Finding one’s way in a looking glass world
The pattern that emerges from this composite litera-
ture suggests a looking glass world nested within a
looking glass world, each paneled with both true and
distorting mirrors. In the broader moral communities
outside of healthcare, we make legitimate moral judg-
ments of each other’s behavior on a continuum from
virtuous to contemptuous. Sustained community con-
tributions garner our praise; child abuse, our censure.
We also make distorted-mirror judgments that are
demonstrably inaccurate and illegitimate because of
stereotypes derived from a host of factors such as age,
gender, ethnicity, wealth, and power. The legitimate
and illegitimate appraisals often reflect and interact,
begetting uncertainty.
Within the healthcare setting, barring incapacity,
patients remain moral agents and retain accountability,
so their behavior in this setting is also subject to legiti-
mate moral judgments. Patients’ violent or racist beha-
vior within healthcare facilities, for instance, arouses
clinicians’ legitimate disapproval and triggers sanction.
The illegitimate, distorted-mirror judgments specific to
healthcare include noncompliance with unrealistic or
inappropriate instructions. Clinicians frustrated by such
non-compliance may label patients “bad.”
For better and worse, clinicians are human, so moral
and social judgments from the broader community can
penetrate into the world of healthcare relationships. The
good news for patients who may appear morally dubious
is that clinicians who feel effective are often happy to
overlook transgressions irrelevant to the healthcare task.
Within the bounded and ritualized healthcare setting,
these “outside” judgments may be inactivated or imma-
terial, especially if the patient presents with a readily
remediable problem, e.g., a minor or straightforward
surgical procedure. In spite of clinicians’ egalitarian
beliefs and professionalism, however, it is unrealistic to
expect that all their moral and social appraisals of
patients as human beings will be immaterial. As noted
by Glaser and Strauss, favored patients are more likely
to get “more than routine care” and less-favored
patients, “less than routine care” [9].
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glass spaces has a yes/but quality reflecting these legiti-
mate and illegitimate judgments, a quality sometimes
evident within a single study. Joan Cassell, who in the
introduction described ICU nurses making judgments of
patients, observed that the surgeons and intensivists
attempted to be unaware of patients’ stories and to
reduce their work to technical, biomedical tasks [3]. Isa-
bel Menzies Lyth described similar strategies among
nurses [60]. “T h ee n t e r p r i s ep r o p o s e st ot o s so u tt h e
baby, the moral dimension of medicine, with the bath-
water, moral judgments of patients,” noted Cassell. “I
believe that even in the highly charged, technologically
driven atmosphere of the SICU, the effort to perceive
the patients as persons, to attend to their stories rather
than ignoring them, leads to more human and humane
care–of patients and their families.” We have no evi-
dence to support her belief, however, whereas she and
others offer ample evidence that more personalized
knowledge of patients can place them in jeopardy of
clinicians’ moral judgments.
Why have we neglected research on moral judgment?
While speculative, explanations of the research neglect
of moral judgment in healthcare could facilitate under-
standing and progress in this domain. Researchers may
have assumed that bioethicists own the topic or that it
requires literacy in moral philosophy. The isolation of
the medical and nursing literatures from mainstream
sociology and psychology may play a role. It is also true
that researchers and clinicians who concentrate on
criminals or other deviant populations in jeopardy of
moral judgment are themselves in jeopardy of what
Goffman called “courtesy stigma” [81]. Thus legitimate
concern about risk to reputation might dissuade some
from exploring this terrain. Finally, given that healthcare
leaders colluded in America’s long history of dividing
patients into deserving and undeserving groups, most
modern educators and professionals have emphasized a
nonjudgmental egalitarianism in which clinicians’ moral
appraisals are taboo. Taboo or not, they are pervasive,
and patients know this. Hall’s likability study demon-
strates that patients are exquisitely sensitive even to
unspoken and perhaps unconscious appraisals. Egalitar-
ian professionalism puts a brave face over a complex
reality. Nursing in particular is beset by a caring ideol-
ogy that discourages frank examination of what nurses
actually feel and do [137].
T h ei s s u eo fp o v e r t yi l l u s trates the legitimate versus
illegitimate looking-glass complexity of moral judg-
ment. As noted in the review cited above, we have
remarkably limited data on clinician attitudes to poor
people [43]. Even in the data we have, there is a gap
with regard to moral judgment. In their review, Wear
and Kuczewski note that a majority of Americans give
more credence to individual, blameworthy causes of
poverty than to social or structural causes; they also
note that such individualistic attributions are more
common among right-wing or conservative Americans.
The thrust of their article is toward overcoming
stereotypical, illegitimate biases against the poor, but
they never acknowledge the possibility that some peo-
ple’s behaviors may indeed be responsible for their
poverty. Researchers in the 1950 s University of Color-
ado study discussed earlier described how faculty and
students were frustrated by the individual behavior
patterns of some poor individuals and families. Such
assessments and frustrations seem to have dropped off
the healthcare research agenda. The only article I
could find from the past two decades directly addres-
sing physician explanations of poverty was from Bel-
gium [40]. The physicians serving a high-poverty area
there showed commendable empathy, understanding,
and concern for their patients, and they cited sociopo-
litical explanations of the poverty. They cited psycholo-
gical and individual explanations as well, however,
most commonly patients’ lack of ambition and motiva-
tion to improve their situation but also addiction, lazi-
ness, and lack of skills or intellectual capacity.
T h e r ei sr e a s o nt ob ec a u t i o u si nt h i sl o o k i n g - g l a s s
space, subject as it is to subtle and not-so-subtle distor-
tions. Many poor people, while themselves suffering
from inaccurate, cruel, and damaging stereotypes, attri-
bute the poverty of other poor people to individual
behavioral causes [138]. More seriously, theories of the
culture of poverty and the underclass, originally
advanced by liberal sociologists, were used by journalists
and politicians to blame and demonize the poor [139].
Sociology is only now recovering enough to get beyond
an individual versus structural either/or dichotomy
toward an understanding of the diversity within poor
communities, even within poor families, and the inter-
play of malignant structural forces with bad behavior at
the individual level [140].
A final reason for caution and discernment is the
overlap of morality and convention. In naturalistic set-
tings, unlike the laboratory, the line between moral and
non-moral violations of expectations and trust is often
not sharp. Philosopher Margaret Urban Walker reminds
us that our everyday lives are littered with small, ordin-
ary violations to which we take offense, some of which
are moral, others more conventional [141]. From the
sociologists we know that clinicians’ moral and social
appraisals often mingle together, and from the neuros-
cientists we know that moral reactions, such as disgust,
may ride non-moral, phylogenetically ancient pathways.
Healthcare’s avoidance of this complexity has not
improved our understanding of it.
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While incomplete, the research base leaves no doubt
that clinicians make moral judgments of their patients.
We know almost nothing about the prevalence of nega-
tive judgments or about their impact on patient care
and on the clinicians themselves. We do not know
which combinations of patient, clinician, and situational
factors trigger negative moral appraisals. We have yet to
wonder whether those appraisals follow a linear or cur-
vilinear line from negligible to substantial impact. Well-
meaning advocacy of nonjudgmental attitudes and
patient-centered care is not likely to achieve its goals if
it discourages understanding what actually happens in
healthcare relationships. On the positive side, we have a
wealth of data from social psychology and neuroscience
that is beginning to demonstrate how moral judgment
emerges from the interplay of rival brain neurocircuits
in the context of human interactions. Research meth-
odologies from these sciences are available to facilitate
the study of moral judgments in healthcare. We are now
in a position to explore how healthcare relationships
arise through our biologically makeshift brains and
bodies and how organizational cultures modulate those
relationships. Improvements in the empirical research
base will inform clinicians’ efforts to minimize stereo-
typing and stigma, honor their own moral feelings and
beliefs, and stay engaged with the patients they find
morally troubling.
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